In the complex landscape of global geopolitics, the involvement of major powers in the development of smaller nations has often been a double-edged sword. China’s increasing presence in countries like the Maldives, Africa, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and others has sparked debates about the nature and consequences of its investments. Critics argue that China’s strategy involves leveraging economic opportunities to extend its influence, creating a debt trap that may ultimately lead these nations to financial instability and ultimate bankruptcy. Therefore, it is important to delve into the unfolding narratives in the Maldives and explore parallels with South Asian and African nations, examining the implications of China’s predatory economic engagement.
The Maldives, often glamorized as a picturesque escape in the Indian Ocean, succumbed to a questionable transformation fueled by an influx of Chinese funds and the construction of the Sinamale Bridge, also cynically dubbed the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge. Presented as a beacon of progress, symbolizing enhanced connectivity and economic prosperity, the Sinamale Bridge concealed its true costs, notably a burdensome $200 million loan from Beijing.[1] This bridge, epitomizing former President Abdullah Yameen’s unabashed pro-China stance, unfolded as a cornerstone in a broader agenda to jumpstart the economy, a vision that incurred massive debts from China.
The picturesque narrative of the Sinamale Bridge belies a more insidious reality — a pact with China that could potentially shackle the Maldives with debt and compromise its sovereignty. The glossy façade of progress conveniently masks the financial entanglements that come at the expense of the Maldivian people. Underneath the surface of connectivity lies a web of indebtedness, with Beijing exerting its influence through economic leverage.
Investigations into the nation’s finances revealed a staggering debt of $3.1 billion owed to China, covering government-to-government loans, funds for state enterprises, and private sector loans guaranteed by the Maldivian government.[2] Mohamed Nasheed, Speaker of the parliament and a key political figure, expressed concerns about the country walking into a debt trap.[3] He questioned the viability of the projects generating enough revenue to repay the loans, emphasizing that the business plans lacked indications of financial sustainability.
Nasheed’s apprehensions echo the experiences of neighboring Sri Lanka, which faced challenges after borrowing extensively from China to rebuild following a prolonged civil war. The Hambantota port, funded by Chinese loans, turned out to be economically unviable, leading to Sri Lanka defaulting on its commitments. The debt restructuring that followed resulted in a Chinese state-run enterprise acquiring a significant stake in the port on a 99-year lease.[4] There are serious speculations that the Maldives might tread a similar path, especially with a debt exceeding half of its annual economic output.
Debt Concerns Extend Beyond the Maldives: A Similar Trend?
The Maldives isn’t the sole country grappling with challenges arising from substantial projects financed under China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Both Malaysia and Myanmar, following changes in leadership, engaged in negotiations to address concerns related to the financial viability of Chinese-funded projects.[5] Waking up the reality of Chinese investment, Myanmar’s government reduced the cost of a Chinese-supported deepwater port in the conflict-laden state of Rakhine from $7.3 billion to $1.3 billion.
Extending gaze beyond South Asia, Africa unfolds as a compelling parallel in China’s economic interactions. Historically exploited for its abundant natural resources during the era of European colonization, Africa encountered hurdles in achieving economic stability post-independence. Over the past few decades, Chinese involvement in Africa has taken the form of significant aid, positioning China as a major investor on the continent.
China’s modus operandi in Africa revolves around a barter system, exchanging valuable natural resources for support in development projects and substantial financial injections.[6] Detractors posit that this economic symbiosis predominantly tilts in favor of China. They point to the conspicuous absence of meaningful African participation in these ventures, fueling skepticism about the substantive nature of the purported development and raising red flags about China’s expanding influence in the region.
The case of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port serves as a cautionary tale. Financed by Chinese money, the port became economically unsustainable within a few years, leading to Colombo defaulting on its commitments. The subsequent debt restructuring saw a Chinese state-run enterprise acquiring a significant stake in the port on a 99-year lease. This strategic asset overlooking vital shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean symbolizes China’s influence.
The international community has expressed apprehensions about China’s infrastructure deals, with accusations of “corrupt infrastructure deals in exchange for political influence.”[7] Earlier, the US government too has criticized China’s “bribe-fueled debt-trap diplomacy,” a term vehemently rejected by Chinese authorities.[8]
The former President of Maldives, Muhamed Nasheed has raised questions about the financial viability of the projects initiated during Yameen’s presidency. He stresses the importance of transparency, urging the government to disclose project details, including business plans and loan agreements. Nasheed advocates for a balanced approach that prioritizes the nation’s interests over political affiliations.
The controversial agreements with China have triggered public outcry and protests in the Maldives. Port trade unions, concerned about the terms of Chinese involvement in the Hambantota port, have called for a reduction in the Chinese stake and a shorter lease period. Citizens, alarmed by the prospect of a “Chinese colony,” have taken to the streets, demanding more transparency and accountability.
Similar sentiments reverberate in Sri Lanka and Africa, where communities affected by Chinese-funded projects voice concerns about inadequate consultation, environmental impact, and the long-term implications of the agreements. The narrative of foreign investments leading to a loss of sovereignty and control is not unique to the Maldives but resonates in various corners of the globe.
As the Maldives grapples with the economic challenges posed by Chinese investments, the nation finds itself at a critical juncture. Navigating the fine line between reaping the rewards of infrastructure development and succumbing to the perils of mounting debt demands not just careful consideration but an urgent need for transparency and accountability. Lessons from the experiences of Sri Lanka, various African, South Asian nations, and other global counterparts emphasize the imperative of prudent and well-informed decision-making. In the shadow of Chinese investments, the smaller nations in South Asia and Africa face a pivotal moment, with the global community scrutinizing closely and acknowledging the far-reaching implications for the evolving dynamics of economic development, geopolitics, and the pursuit of financial independence. The experiences of other nations serve as cautionary tales, compelling policymakers to proceed with utmost caution in their pursuit of progress.
[1] https://avas.mv/en/16140
[2] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/chinese-debt-casts-shadow-over-maldives-economy/articleshow/78172615.cms?from=mdr
[3] https://www.firstpost.com/world/china-is-using-a-debt-trap-as-a-disciplinary-tool-to-run-maldives-ex-president-mohamed-nasheed-tells-firstpost-4350917.html
[4] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/report-that-hambantota-port-deal-has-second-99-year-lease-extension-runs-counter-to-facts-china/articleshow/81194141.cms
[5] https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/18/countries-are-reducing-belt-and-road-investments-over-financing-fears.html
[6] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA491923.pdf
[7] https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/FP_20190930_china_bri_dollar.pdf
[8] https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/S0161-723020230000038009/full/html?skipTracking=true