The recent ousting of the longest-serving Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, by a mass movement which started as a student protest has caught the world’s attention for both the suddenness of the event and the vandalism on display. The resignation and escape of Hasina may have been swift but the angst and disgruntlement portrayed by the mass protesters point to a deeper rot in the political establishment of which the reinstated job quota is perhaps, only a tipping point. For Kautilya, Hasina has broken the social contract and has failed to achieve yogakshema (security and prosperity) for the citizens of Bangladesh.
Power is not success
Hailed by the World Bank as the ‘country on a mission’ Bangladesh has seen rapid economic growth in the past two decades. The gross domestic product (GDP) of Bangladesh grew to US$446.35 billion in 2023, an increase of about US$253 billion since 2014. Recent macroeconomic headwinds notwithstanding, the moderated growth of fiscal year 2023 is projected to edge up in FY 2024. Bangladesh ranks third in terms of military expenditure in South Asia and ranks 37 of 145 countries on the global firepower index. With these economic and military indices of comprehensive national power, why have things come to such a pass? Kautilya, an ancient Indian strategist, would reason that the swami (ruler) and amatya (council of ministers), making the two most important constituent elements (ranking higher than economic and military might) of the Kautilyan state, were in disarray and inept in translating the possession of strength (power) to the happiness of the people (success).
The ancient political treatise on statecraft, Arthashastra, is categorical about the roots of popular uprisings—“The use of peace and other policies not in the prescribed manner is a wrong policy. From that springs dangers (of conspiracy or revolt).” His advice to the political leadership facing these challenges is categorical too—“The ruler should not allow causes of decline, greed, and disaffection among the subjects to arise, and if arisen, should immediately counter-act them. Kautilya squarely puts the blame on a wrong policy enunciated by the ruler and the ruling class as the reason for popular revolt. In this context, the most notable statement coming from Sheikh Hasina’s son, Sajeeb Wazed Joy, is the admission of mistakes in handling of the student protests—perhaps, too little and too late.
Let us assess the addressal of what is seen as the symptom of the graver problem of disaffection and mistrust of the Awami League rule—the student protest. Far from acknowledging the problem raised, the Hasina government detracting from the Kautilyan rules of engagement with the multitude of people, cracked down on the masses. The Kautilyan toolkit provides an array of remedial and suppressive approaches to tackle internal security challenges but is clear about seeking success over the people only through means excepting force—conciliation, gifts, exemption, and employment.
Rajamandala dynamics
Notwithstanding the internal fissures and general resentment, a ‘foreign hand’ cannot be ruled out. The Arthashastra delineates four kinds of dangers in the realm of internal security based on the origin of instigation and the response (outer-inner, inner-outer, outer-outer, and inner-inner), and prescribes countermeasures based on the type of association and the target audience. The external/outer abetment can be possible only if there is a response in the interior symptomatic of a general disenchantment. If the association is between ‘two types’ (abetment from outer and response in the interior), then success over one who responds is more advantageous, and Kautilya would prescribe the use of only sama (conciliation) and dana (gift-giving). The ousted Prime Minister would do well to reflect on her own incapacities and misjudgements rather than blame the United States (US).
What are the potential external interests that may have arguably fished in Dhaka’s troubled waters? The US is the quintessential udasina (neutral king) which sits outside Bangladesh’s rajamandala (circle of kings), is stronger than the constituents of the potential conqueror (vijigishu), enemy (ari) and the middle king (madhyama) put together, and is capable of keeping them united or disunited based on its national interests.
Dhaka’s attempts to diversify by placing some eggs in the China basket have ruffled feathers in Washington which would use any opportunity to place a more pliant government. Additionally, a tumultuous neighbourhood on a previously relatively secure border, a potential revival of cross-border terrorism, and a US-backed establishment in Dhaka could arguably keep Washington’s strategic partner in the region—India—hemmed in, particularly when Delhi’s independent decision-making runs contrary to US interests in the region and beyond. Kautilya would sanction the udasina’s move (the US in this context) intent on allowing the weaker partner to neither become too powerful nor too weak.
China is the madhyama which (almost) sits abutting the territories of Bangladesh (vijigishu) and Myanmar (potential enemy), is stronger than the two put together, and can keep them united or disunited in pursuance of its political goals. While the Hasina government may have been favourable to China, its proximity with India and her effective crackdown on anti-India terror groups in Bangladesh could arguably propel China to fan the people’s movement and destabilise yet another border of India.
Pakistan is an innate enemy by birth. It is also in league with China and shares Beijing’s inimical disposition towards India. There are intelligence reports that have identified the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami as having played a pivotal role, with evidence of training in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The possible return of Khaleda Zia with an anti-India stance would serve Islamabad’s interests.
India is a mitra (ally) for Bangladesh. Hasina gained Delhi’s patronage with deft diplomacy, without losing out on lucrative deals from its adversary in the region. With the red lines met and Dhaka broadly identifying with India, Delhi’s friendship was mutually beneficial, even as anti-India sentiments among Bangladeshis was on the rise.
Hasina’s external parleys with regional and great powers have followed the Kautilyan handbook—hedging, leveraging its neutrality to strike deals, and rarely crossing the set red lines. But she failed to ascertain the pulse of the citizens. Robustness in domestic security is key, both for sound political legitimacy and for safeguarding itself from the machinations of external powers. Internal security is the bedrock of successful strategic autonomy.