How will Russia’s invasion of Ukraine impact the Indo-Pacific?
Much depends on how the crisis resolves, but it’s not likely to shape events as many anticipate. Europe is half a world away, Russia has both a marginal presence — meaning it poses little threat — and a distinct role (arms supplier) in this region, and the logic behind diplomacy and national security policy in regional capitals regarding Moscow remains compelling.
Sylvie Kauffmann, editorial director and columnist at the French newspaper Le Monde, argued in The Financial Times last week that “a new Europe is emerging” in the wake of the invasion, citing Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the European Union, who said that Europe “will be forged in crises.”
She anticipates that this week’s meeting of EU heads of state and government, at which they will discuss security policies, will be a watershed. Given the decision by the German government to radically increase defense spending and reports that Finland and Sweden are considering membership in NATO, she could be right.
In this part of the world, the outlook is quite different. When the United Nations General Assembly voted last week to condemn the invasion 141-5, Asian countries were notable for abstaining: China, India, Laos, Mongolia, Pakistan and Vietnam were in that group, as was Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. None of those votes was particularly surprising — most reflect concern about continued access to Russian weapons — although the last three (like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, neither of which voted) might have been expected to vote “no” given their close ties to Moscow.
Some governments in this part of the world fear that China will conclude that Russia solved a territorial problem by force and attempt to do the same to unify Taiwan with the mainland or to extend its reach in the South China Sea. If the Ukrainian resistance and the resulting global revulsion at Russia didn’t puncture that bubble, the West’s response to the invasion should have.
The size and scale of the reaction — not only the sanctions package, but the dynamics that Kauffmann refers to — must sober Beijing. Charles Edel, a thoughtful historian who occupies the Australia chair at CSIS, argues that the invasion “turbocharges efforts that are under way” to build a regional security architecture.
Japan’s response is held out as symbolic of this change. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has bluntly denounced the invasion, saying it “undermines the very foundation of the international order as an attempt to unilaterally change the status quo by force.” In a break with policy, Tokyo has agreed to provide Ukraine with nonlethal defense equipment such as bulletproof vests, helmets, tents, cameras and generators.
Kishida explained that the donations show that “Japan stands side by side with the Ukrainian people, who are trying desperately to defend their sovereignty, homeland and families.” Moreover, Japan, historically reluctant to impose sanctions, has bucked tradition and joined the multilateral campaign to punish Russia. U.S. Ambassador Rahm Emanuel applauded the moves as “historic” and an “unprecedented” decision that “demonstrates Japan’s strong commitment” to liberty, democracy, human dignity and international law.
More alarming to Chinese strategists must be the failure of a strategy to use economic leverage to bend foreign governments to China’s will. They reasoned that dependence on China would either put countries on the fence or get them to side openly with Beijing in a crisis. That’s not happening, says Bonny Lin, China chair at CSIS. Europe may be dependent on Russian energy, but the continent is becoming more unified in its defiance of Moscow. “This should at least introduce some uncertainty when China thinks about how countries position themselves during peacetime versus how countries position making change in a crisis or a conflict,” Lin suggested.
The flaws in Chinese reasoning have been apparent for some time. Seoul’s decision to deploy the THA missile-defense system in 2017 against Chinese wishes was proof that direct national security threats trump economic worries. And again, Seoul has lined up with the West, “standing shoulder to shoulder in support of Ukraine” (reports the State Department) to support economic sanctions and export controls against Russia, along with other measures.
Nevertheless, there have been some head-scratching statements. Especially troubling (to me, at least) was the Feb. 26 declaration by ASEAN foreign ministers that referred to the “ongoing military hostilities in Ukraine.” It called “for an immediate cease-fire or armistice and continuation of political dialogues that would lead to sustainable peace in Ukraine,” but never used the word “invasion” or mentioned Russia.
For an organization that insists on noninterference in internal affairs and sovereignty, I thought an actual invasion or the dismembering of a state by a neighbor would have warranted condemnation without a moment’s hesitation. Silly me.
India is another seeming anomaly, with its abstention at the U.N. raising some eyebrows. Rupa Subramanya, a distinguished fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, argued that New Delhi’s calculations are complex, and defy a simple narrative of good and evil. The threat from China and Pakistan, she wrote in Nikkei Asia, means that India “has no choice but to balance its historical friendship with Russia and its strengthening ties with the U.S. … Going all-in with the U.S. and its allies in a war that is of no direct consequence to India, while alienating an important partner in the form of Russia, simply makes no sense at all.”
She echoed Nitin Pai, who I cited two weeks ago, noting that the West is fighting to preserve an old world order. “Today, countries such as India and China are already looking to shape a new world order which recognizes the primacy of Asia in 21st century economic and geopolitical realities. The battle for Ukraine may indeed be the last battle of the 20th century.”
There is a kernel of truth to that claim, but decisionmaking in this case may be the product of more prosaic concerns. Russia has sold weapons to Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar and Vietnam. India is the second-largest importer of Russian weapons, which account for about half of its military supplies. Moscow has also provided political cover for New Delhi, vetoing U.N. resolutions critical of India’s behavior in Kashmir. Strongmen in Bangkok, Hanoi, Manila and Naypyidaw have condemned the invasion but swallowed criticism of Russia or President Vladimir Putin.
The invasion of Ukraine is such an egregious violation of international rules and norms that it is almost impossible for a government that aspires to international leadership or status, and certainly a U.S. ally, to not condemn Russia. When European allies signaled their readiness to pay a price to punish Moscow, Asian allies and partners had little choice but to follow.
Yet even among the countries leaning most far forward in Asia, there is nothing like the reaction in Berlin — no sizable increase in defense budgets. There are a few voices calling for more money, but that is their long-standing refrain. Powerful constituencies here oppose disinvesting from major business projects in Russia; a similar argument is heard in Seoul. Singapore is the only Southeast Asian nation to join the sanctions effort. There is no discussion of a new security arrangement to support the regional status quo.
Earlier this week in The Japan Times, historian Hal Brands wrote that Putin has revealed that “the world order that we have taken for granted is remarkably fragile.” Will that spur us to save and strengthen it? In Europe, the answer appears to be yes. Worryingly, in Asia the jury is still out.
Brad Glosserman is deputy director of and visiting professor at the Center for Rule-Making Strategies at Tama University as well as senior adviser (nonresident) at Pacific Forum. He is the author of “Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions” (Georgetown University Press, 2019).